Shanghai Electric swept two SIAC arbitrations against Reliance worth USD 146 million. Now comes the harder question: can it actually collect? That answer is still very much open.

Background

The saga started in 2008. Sasan Power Limited, a subsidiary of Reliance Infrastructure Limited (“Reliance Infrastructure”), was building the Sasan Ultra Mega Power Project – a 6x660MW ultra-large supercritical coal-fired power station in Sasan Village, Sidhi District, Madhya Pradesh (the “Sasan Project”). To supply the major equipment, on 26 June 2008, an English company called Reliance Infra Projects (UK) Limited (“Reliance UK”) – a Reliance-linked entity, signed an ‘Equipment Supply and Service Contract’ (“Supply Contract”) with Shanghai Electric Group Co. Ltd. (“Shanghai Electric”), worth USD 1.311 billion. Rajesh Agrawal, who was the Additional Vice-President of Reliance Infrastructure at the time, signed the Supply Contract on Reliance UK’s behalf, and his authority to do so was never disputed.[1]

Critically, on 26 June 2008, Reliance Infrastructure issued a guarantee letter, guaranteeing Reliance UK’s payment obligations under the Supply Contract (the “Guarantee Letter”). The Guarantee Letter was signed by Agrawal and contained a Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) arbitration clause providing for arbitration under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, with a seat in Singapore.

The project was commissioned on 30 March 2015, and the last consignment of spare parts was delivered on 23 November 2017. As of August 2019, Shanghai Electric was owed approximately USD 135,320,728.42 (roughly INR 995 crore) under the Supply Contract. On 23 August 2019, Shanghai Electric issued a notice of dispute under the Guarantee Letter to Reliance Infrastructure (“First Notice of Dispute”), seeking payment within 60 days.

Arbitration I

When the First Notice of Dispute went unanswered, Shanghai Electric issued a notice invoking SIAC arbitration on 13 December 2019; this became “Arbitration I,” registered as SIAC Case No. 448 of 2019, demanding at least USD 135 million (later approximately USD 146-147 million once interest was added).

While the arbitration was pending, Shanghai Electric grew concerned that Reliance Infrastructure was hurriedly dissipating its assets to defeat any future award and filed a petition under Section 9 of India’s Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking interim relief; specifically, to secure the disputed amount and restrain Reliance Infrastructure from disposing of assets. On 19 July 2022, a single judge of the Delhi High Court dismissed that petition.[2]

Then, on 8 December 2022, the SIAC tribunal issued its unanimous Final Award in Arbitration I, ordering Reliance Infrastructure to pay Shanghai Electric approximately USD 146-147 million plus interest, while affirming some of Reliance Infrastructure’s claimed set-offs and disallowing others.[3]

Reliance Infrastructure’s challenge before the Singapore International Commercial Court

Reliance Infrastructure did not pay. Instead, in March 2023, it went before the Singapore International Commercial Court (the “SICC”), seeking to set aside the award entirely. It argued that the arbitration agreement itself was invalid, because either (1) Agrawal’s signature on the Guarantee Letter had been forged by Shanghai Electric, or, in the alternative, (2) even if he did sign it, Agrawal lacked the authority to bind Reliance Infrastructure to arbitrate.

On 31 January 2024, the SICC dismissed Reliance Infrastructure’s application in full, finding that Reliance Infrastructure had failed to prove its forgery allegations on the merits. [4] More fundamentally, the court held that Reliance Infrastructure had waived its right to raise the forgery/lack-of-authority objection at all, because it had deliberately chosen not to raise this jurisdictional ground before the SIAC tribunal during the arbitration itself, even while contesting the merits of the claim.[5]

Legal battles in India

Around the same time, Shanghai Electric filed a separate enforcement petition in the Delhi High Court, seeking to enforce the December 2022 award from Arbitration I.

On 6 March 2024, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court ruled on Shanghai Electric’s appeal from the July 2022 dismissal of its Section 9 interim relief petition, and clarified an important procedural point for foreign-seated arbitrations: because Section 36 of the Indian Arbitration Act (which governs enforcement of domestic awards) does not apply to foreign awards, the “before it is enforced under Section 36” outer limit does not restrict the availability of Section 9 interim relief in aid of foreign-seated arbitrations.[6]

Then, in July 2024, Reliance Infrastructure went on the offensive in a different forum entirely: it filed a criminal complaint with Mumbai’s Economic Offences Wing (EOW), alleging that Shanghai Electric officials had forged not just the Guarantee Letter, but a similar guarantee letter for the Butibori Power Plant in Nagpur, had forged Agrawal’s signature on both, and then submitted the forged Sasan letter in the SIAC arbitration. A First Information Report (FIR) was registered, notwithstanding that the Singapore courts had already examined and rejected this exact forgery allegation on the merits.[7]

Reliance Infrastructure’s last remaining avenue of challenge closed on 17 December 2024, when a three-judge panel of the Singapore Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed Reliance Infrastructure’s appeal, upholding the SICC on both the waiver point and the forgery point.[8] The Court of Appeal held that it was impermissible for an award debtor to “hedge”, i.e. contest the merits of a claim while consciously not raising an available jurisdictional objection, and then try to raise that objection only after losing, without ever reserving its rights to do so. The court also rejected Reliance Infrastructure’s separate public policy ground for setting aside the award.

Arbitration II

Meanwhile, a second, parallel arbitration had been brewing. Reliance UK, by then renamed Oxagon Enterprises Limited (“Oxagon”), had filed its own counterclaim against Shanghai Electric, seeking approximately USD 389 million in alleged losses connected to the same Sasan Project relationship. This became “Arbitration II.”

On 2 July 2026, Shanghai Electric announced that the SIAC tribunal in Arbitration II had dismissed all of Oxagon’s claims in their entirety.[9] The ruling is final, binding, and preclusive; Oxagon is now barred from bringing further arbitration or litigation on the same or substantially similar claims. Oxagon was ordered to pay Shanghai Electric approximately USD 1.2784 million in legal fees and expert costs, while Shanghai Electric was required to pay Oxagon only S$ 92,400 in arbitration fees.[10] The award brought what commentators called a “seven-year arbitration tug-of-war,” spanning an 18-year commercial relationship dating back to 2008 to a close – at least on the merits.

But here is the catch

As of that July 2026 announcement, the USD 146 million awarded back in December 2022 remained entirely uncollected. Shanghai Electric itself stated that because both awards remain subject to enforcement, the impact on its current or future profits is uncertain.[11] This is not a statement that enforcement has failed – it is a statement that enforcement has not yet happened, and that is a very different thing.

For context on Shanghai Electric’s own financial position, the company reported full-year 2025 revenue of RMB 126.679 billion (approximately USD 18.6 billion), up 9% year-on-year, and net profit attributable to the parent of RMB 1.206 billion (approximately USD 177.5 million), up 60.3%. In Q1 2026, revenue reached RMB 24.319 billion (approximately USD 3.6 billion), up 9.49% year-on-year.[12] The Sasan dispute, in other words, is a significant legal matter, but not an existential one for Shanghai Electric’s overall business.

Finally, none of this happened in a vacuum. Reliance UK and Reliance Infrastructure’s payment problems mirror the broader financial unravelling of the Anil Ambani-led Reliance Group over the past decade. Ambani’s personal net worth fell from an estimated USD 42 billion at its 2008 peak, briefly making him the world’s sixth-richest person, to an estimated USD 530 million to 1 billion by 2025-2026, and in a 2020 UK court declaration he claimed “zero net worth.”[13] Group companies, including Reliance Communications, Reliance Capital, and Reliance Naval, have all gone through insolvency in the years since.[14] A protracted, high-value payment default to a Chinese equipment supplier fits an unfortunately familiar pattern.

Two companies, two fights

Shanghai Electric holds awards against two separate entities, and each requires its own enforcement path:

What to watch next

Winning an arbitration and collecting on it are two entirely different fights, governed by two entirely different bodies of law, and right now Shanghai Electric is only one fight into a two-fight campaign. Here is what matters going forward.

The Delhi High Court enforcement petition

India enforces foreign arbitral awards under Part II, Chapter I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which gives domestic effect to the New York Convention (India ratified the Convention subject to a “commercial relationship reservation”).[15] Section 44 defines a “foreign award” and requires that the seat of arbitration be on India’s list of reciprocating territories, for which Singapore qualifies.

Shanghai Electric’s enforcement petition has been pending in the Delhi High Court since early 2024, and Reliance Infrastructure’s objection to territorial jurisdiction does not appear to have been conclusively resolved based on publicly available records – this is the single biggest open procedural question in this entire saga.

The pace of even preliminary procedural steps in this case is instructive. Shanghai Electric’s earlier Section 9 interim relief petition was dismissed in July 2022, and only received jurisdictional clarity on appeal in March 2024 – a two-year gap for what was essentially a procedural question about whether Section 9 relief is available for foreign-seated arbitrations.  These timelines are informative about pace, even if they say nothing definitive about the ultimate outcome.

Section 48 Arbitration Act and the Public Policy Defence

Under Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (which mirrors Article V of the New York Convention), enforcement of a foreign award can be refused only on limited grounds: invalidity of the arbitration agreement, improper notice, an award that strays beyond the scope of the parties’ submission, improper constitution of the tribunal, an award not yet binding (or set aside at the seat), non-arbitrability, or conflict with India’s public policy.[16] The public policy ground has generated the most litigation, and the case law shows a clear trend toward narrowing it.

In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.[17], the Supreme Court held that “public policy” in the international enforcement context is much narrower than in a purely domestic setting, and that refusal is justified only where enforcement would violate the fundamental policy of Indian law, the interests of India, or basic notions of justice and morality – not merely because the award contains an error of Indian law. In Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano Spa,[18] the Supreme Court went further, holding that Section 48 does not permit Indian courts to take a “second look” at the merits of a foreign award.

Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Srl[19] pushed the pro-enforcement trend further still: the Supreme Court held that Section 48 crystallises the New York Convention’s pro-enforcement bias, that courts cannot second-guess an arbitrator’s interpretation of a contract, that a rectifiable breach of India’s Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) does not automatically violate fundamental policy since the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) can direct compliance or condone the breach, and that “patent illegality” – a ground available for challenging domestic awards – is not available as a ground for refusing enforcement of a foreign award. The Delhi High Court’s decision in Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Limited[20] reinforced the same principle: a mere breach of a legal provision does not, without more, amount to a breach of India’s fundamental policy.

The one significant wrinkle is NAFED v. Alimenta S.A.[21], in which the Supreme Court refused enforcement on the basis of Section 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, in a way that critics say involved exactly the kind of merits engagement the other authorities cautioned against. Most commentators treat NAFED as a narrow, fact-specific outlier rather than a reversal of the broader pro-enforcement trend, but it continues to be cited by award debtors looking for a foothold. For Shanghai Electric, the practical upshot is that Indian law is generally on its side, but “generally” is not “certainly.”

The crowded creditor queue

Even a fully enforceable decree is only as valuable as the debtor’s ability to pay. In June 2025, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) admitted an insolvency plea against Reliance Infrastructure filed by Dhursar Solar Power over unpaid dues of approximately INR 88 crore.[22] A separate insolvency proceeding involving roughly INR 90 crore was paused by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) after Reliance Infrastructure cleared the relevant dues.[23] The Enforcement Directorate (ED) has seized more than USD 2 billion in Reliance Group-linked assets, and is reportedly examining whether the group influenced the insolvency proceedings of some of its own companies.[24]

In June 2026, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) rejected settlement applications from Reliance Infrastructure and Anil Ambani in a case alleging misutilisation of INR 6,526 crore in exposure to a contractor that SEBI found was effectively controlled by the Reliance Anil Dhirubhai Ambani (ADA) group.[25] Also in June 2026, the NCLT admitted an insolvency petition against Anil Ambani personally, as a guarantor for Reliance Communications loans totalling approximately INR 1,200 crore.[26]

Positive signals? Deleveraging and operational recovery

Reliance Infrastructure has been actively deleveraging: its standalone debt reportedly fell from approximately INR 3,831 crore to INR 475 crore – it repaid a USD 150 million loan tied to Sasan Power itself, cleared INR 3,872 crore owed to Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd, and settled its dues to Yes Bank. India Ratings upgraded Reliance Infrastructure from D to B in 2025, citing timely servicing of standalone debt for three consecutive months, while flagging elevated group-level risk.[27] Reliance Infrastructure reported financial year 2026 revenue of over USD 2 billion and net profit of approximately USD 505 million.[28] The group has publicly stated that most ED attachments relate to Reliance Communications, which is no longer part of the group since 2019, rather than to Reliance Infrastructure or Reliance Power.[29] For an award creditor, a debtor with improving liquidity is, at the margin, better news than a debtor in terminal decline.

The EOW criminal complaint

Reliance Infrastructure’s July 2024 criminal complaint in Mumbai, alleging that Shanghai Electric forged the Guarantee Letter, sits awkwardly alongside the fact that Singapore’s courts – both the SICC and the Court of Appeal – have already examined and rejected that exact forgery allegation on the merits.

Indian public policy jurisprudence generally does not permit a “second look” at issues already adjudicated on the merits abroad, but award debtors facing enforcement sometimes attempt to invoke parallel criminal proceedings as part of a public-policy-adjacent argument. Whether this complaint resurfaces in the enforcement proceedings, and how the Delhi High Court treats it given the Singapore findings, is worth tracking.

The Oxagon enforcement track: Arbitration II

The Arbitration II costs award of approximately USD 1.2784 million runs against Oxagon Enterprises Limited (the UK-incorporated entity formerly known as Reliance UK), not against Reliance Infrastructure. Because Oxagon is a distinct corporate entity, collecting this smaller sum would require a separate enforcement effort, most likely in the UK or wherever Oxagon holds assets, entirely apart from the Indian proceedings. No enforcement steps appear to have been taken yet, simply because it is brand new.

The broader comparative point

India and Singapore both market themselves as pro-enforcement, pro-arbitration jurisdictions, but they get there differently. Singapore’s courts apply a consistently narrow, process-focused standard of review. India’s courts, while increasingly aligned with that same philosophy since Renusagar and especially since Vijay Karia, have historically been willing to engage more deeply with the merits at the margins, as NAFED illustrates.[30] This is a difference of degree, not of direction; but degree matters enormously to a creditor waiting on a decree.

None of this means Shanghai Electric will not get paid. It means the collection question is still genuinely open, on both the Indian and UK tracks, and will likely remain open for some time yet.

The real lesson for other foreign equipment suppliers and engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractors doing business in India is not that arbitration doesn’t work – the arbitration process here worked exactly as intended, twice. It is that enforcement strategy, asset-tracing, and interim relief planning need to start on day one of the commercial relationship, not after the award has already been won.

How Gherson can assist?

Gherson’s Litigation and Arbitration Team are highly experienced in advising on international commercial litigation and arbitration matters. If you have any questions arising from this blog, please do not hesitate to contact us for advice, or send us an e-mail. Don’t forget to follow us on X, Facebook, Instagram, or LinkedIn to stay-up-to-date.

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[1]Jus Mundi, “Grounds of Decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal [2024] SGCA(I) 10, https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-shanghai-electric-group-company-limited-v-reliance-infra-projects-uk-limited-reliance-infrastructure-limited-and-sasan-power-limited-grounds-of-decision-of-the-singapore-court-of-appeal-2024-sgca-i-10-tuesday-17th-december-2024

[2]Indian Kanoon, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/15628421/

[3]Fountain Court Chambers, “Singapore Court of Appeal upholds decision on high-profile US$146 million arbitration award,” https://fountaincourt.uk/2025/01/singapore-court-of-appeal-upholds-decision-on-high-profile-us146-million-arbitration-award/

[4] Reliance Infrastructure Limited v Shanghai Electric Group Co Ltd. [2024] SGHC(I) 3, https://www.elitigation.sg/gd/s/2024_SGHCI_3

[5]Lexology, “Reliance Infrastructure Ltd v Shanghai Electric Group,” https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7579471e-c260-4d97-bc6f-7dcdfe52ab65

[6]IBC Law, “Shanghai Electric Group Co. Ltd vs Reliance Infrastructure Ltd – Delhi High Court,” https://ibclaw.in/shanghai-electric-group-co-ltd-vs-reliance-infrastructure-ltd-delhi-high-court/

[7]Hindustan Times, “EOW books Shanghai Electric officials for cheating, forgery after R-Infra’s complaint,” https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/mumbai-news/eow-books-shanghai-electric-officials-for-cheating-forgery-after-r-infra-s-complaint-101721329353158.html

[8]Reliance Infrastructure Ltd v Shanghai Electric Group [2024] SGCA(I) 10

[9] Official announcement (in Chinese): https://www.sewpg.com/listed_en/tzzgx/

[10] The Globe and Mail, “Shanghai Electric Wins Key Rulings in Sasan Power Project Arbitration Battle,” https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/stocks/SIELF/pressreleases/3113977/shanghai-electric-wins-key-rulings-in-sasan-power-project-arbitration-battle/

[11]  BigGo Finance, “Shanghai Electric Wins Final Victory in India Arbitration as $389 Million Claim Dismissed, but Enforcement Outlook Remains Uncertain,” https://finance.biggo.com/news/c92e5e37-32ca-4415-b47d-345b61ff3493

[12]Ibid.

[13]The Times of India, “Anil Ambani tells UK Court his ‘net worth was zero’ despite fleet of cars, private jet and yacht”, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/anil-ambani-tells-uk-court-his-net-worth-is-zero-despite-fleet-of-cars-private-jet-and-yacht/articleshow/74017394.cms; for the enthusiastic ones, the judgment is Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd v Ambani [2020] EWHC 1131 (Comm).

[14]Business Times Singapore, “How Anil Ambani’s once-sprawling business empire landed in investigators’ crosshairs,” https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/international/global/how-anil-ambanis-once-sprawling-business-empire-landed-investigators-crosshairs

[15]Columbia ARIA, “Assessing the Public Policy Exception and Comparative Perspectives in Enforcing Arbitral Awards: Where Does India Stand?,” https://aria.law.columbia.edu/assessing-the-public-policy-exception-and-comparative-perspectives-in-enforcing-arbitral-awards-where-does-india-stand/

[16]Section 48, Conditions for enforcement of foreign awards, Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996

[17]  AIR 1994 SC 860

[18] (2014) 2 SCC 433

[19] AIR 2020 SC 1807

[20] Delhi High Court, EX.P.132/2014 & EA(OS) Nos.316/2015, 1058/2015 & 151/2016 & 670/2016

[21] AIR 2020 SCC 2681

[22]Simple Path, “Anil Ambani’s Reliance Power: Resilient Comeback or Speculative Surge?,” https://simplepath.in/news-updates/articles/anil-ambanis-reliance-power-resilient-comeback-or-speculative-surge/

[23]Economic Times, “Reliance Infra Debt: Latest News,” https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/reliance-infra-debt

[24]Business Times Singapore, “How Anil Ambani’s once-sprawling business empire landed in investigators’ crosshairs,” https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/international/global/how-anil-ambanis-once-sprawling-business-empire-landed-investigators-crosshairs

[25]Moneylife, “SEBI Rejects Settlement Bids by Reliance Infrastructure and Anil Ambani in ₹6,526 Crore Case,” https://www.moneylife.in/article/securities-and-exchange-board-of-india-rejects-settlement-bids-by-reliance-infrastructure-and-anil-ambani-in-6526-crore-case/80904.html

[26]The Hindu Business Line, “NCLT admits insolvency pleas against Anil Ambani and RInfra arm over ₹1480 crore dues,” https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/nclt-admits-insolvency-pleas-against-anil-ambani-and-rinfra-arm-over-1480-crore-dues/article71089738.ece

[27]Indian Express, “ED raids: Anil Ambani’s fall and the flicker of a comeback,” https://indianexpress.com/article/business/companies/ed-raids-anil-ambanis-fall-and-the-flicker-of-a-comeback-10147174/

[28]Business Times Singapore, “How Anil Ambani’s once-sprawling business empire landed in investigators’ crosshairs,” https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/international/global/how-anil-ambanis-once-sprawling-business-empire-landed-investigators-crosshairs

[29]Indian News Network, “Anil Ambani’s Reliance Group Faces New Investigation Over Fund Misuse,” https://www.indianewsnetwork.com/en/anil-ambani-reliance-group-faces-new-investigation-over-fund-misuse-20251106

[30]Global Arbitration Review, “The Asia-Pacific Arbitration Review 2027 – India v Singapore as Enforcement Forums,” https://globalarbitrationreview.com/review/the-asia-pacific-arbitration-review/2027/article/india-v-singapore-enforcement-forums-pro-enforcement-rhetoric-and-evolving-judicial-practices.