English court confirms the strict construction of the time limit for challenges under s.69 of the UK Arbitration Act 1996

An interesting judgment involving a Russian party, sanctions and a mid-proceedings change of lawyers

This blogpost concerns an English High Court judgment handed down on 21 October 2025 by Mr Justice Bright in the case JSC Kazan Oil Plant v. Aves Trade DMCC [2025] EWHC 2713 (Comm).

Background

The claimant, JSC Kazan Oil Plant (“Claimant”), a Russian entity, entered into a contract with Aves Trade DMCC (“Defendant”), a UAE company, for the sale of crude sunflower oil. The contract was subject to the Rules of Arbitration and Appeal of the Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Association Limited (FOSFA).

A dispute arose which led to the arbitration proceedings. FOSFA operates a two-tier system of arbitral process: the first tier and the appeal. On 27 March 2024, the first-tier tribunal (FTT) issued an award in favour of the Defendant (the “FTT Award”). The Claimant appealed the FTT Award to the Board of Appeal, and the latter issued its award on 26 March 2025 (the “Appeal Award”). An interesting feature of the FOSFA Rules of Arbitration and Appeal is that they give the Board of Appeal powers to hold the award up until the appellant pays outstanding fees, costs and expenses of the arbitration.

That is exactly what happened in this case. The Board of Appeal made the release of the Appeal Award conditional upon receiving from the Claimant an outstanding amount of £20,466.94. Due to sanctions, the Claimant encountered difficulties in paying that balance. The payment on behalf of the Claimant was finally made by an intermediary in the UAE on Saturday 8 April 2025. Following this, on Monday 10 April 2025, the Appeal Award was released to the parties.

The Claimant subsequently sought to challenge the Appeal Award under s.69 of the UK Arbitration Act 1996 (“AA 1996”) on a point of law. S.69 AA 1996 is quite a peculiar provision of English law, as other jurisdictions ordinarily do not allow appeals against arbitral awards on points of law. Under s.70 AA 1996, a s.69 appeal must be filed within a 28-day time limit. The s.69 appeal claim form was issued on 8 May 2025. That meant that the appeal was filed late, if the 28-days period is calculated from the date of the Appeal Award (43 days). On the other hand, if the period is calculated from the date the Claimant actually received the Appeal Award – i.e. 10 April 2025 – the s.69 appeal was filed just in time (28 days).

The law

Article 70(3) AA 1996, before the amendment by the Arbitration Act 2025, read as follows:

“70 Challenge or appeal: supplementary provisions. 

(1) The following provisions apply to an application or appeal under section 67, 68 or 69.

(2) An application or appeal may not be brought if the applicant or appellant has not first exhausted—

(a) any available arbitral process of appeal or review, and

(b) any available recourse under section 57 (correction of award or additional award).

(3) Any application or appeal must be brought within 28 days of the date of the award or, if there has been any arbitral process of appeal or review, of the date when the applicant or appellant was notified of the result of that process”.

Therefore, the Court had to answer two questions:

1. Was the Claimant’s challenge filed in time?
2. If not, should time be extended under s.80(5) AA 1996?

Was the Claimant’s challenge filed in time?

On a plain reading, article 70(3) AA 1996 contains two limbs regarding time limits, depending on the stage of the arbitral process: when the award is final and when there is an appeal route within the arbitral process. For both situations, the time limit is 28 days. What is different, however, is the point from which the clock starts running. In the first limb, time starts running from the date of the award. In the second limb, however, time starts running from the date the challenger was notified of the result of the arbitral process of appeal or review. Therefore, the Claimant argued that the second limb applies, and, therefore, time runs from the date it received the Appeal Award. The Defendant, however, asserted that the first limb applies, hence, time ran from the date of the Appeal Award.

It appears that the second limb time limit of s.70(3) AA 1996 can be interpreted in two ways. The first approach is that only awards still open to appeal inside the arbitral process are covered by the second limb time limit. The second approach is that this provision refers not to a specific award open to s.67/s.68/s.69 AA 1996 appeals, but rather to the modality, i.e. any final appeal award in the two-tier system is covered by the second limb time limit.

The second approach appears to be more logical. The text of the second limb can be interpreted to suggest that the drafters of the AA 1996 envisaged that an appeal decision can take different forms. To accommodate this, the drafters proposed the wording of the second limb – more liberal and open to a wider interpretation.

Counterintuitively, though, the Court took the first approach, thus giving a lot of weight to two authorities.

Firstly, the Court referred, with approval, to a report prepared in February 1996 by the Departmental Commission on Arbitration (DAC) while drafting the UK Arbitration Act 1996. In this report, DAC observed:

“… It is possible that the time limit in Clause 70(3) will have expired by the time an award is released. However, the DAC is of the view that the date of the award is the only incontrovertible date from which the time period should run. Any other starting point would result in great uncertainty (e.g. as to the exact point at which an award is “released” or “delivered”). Further, any difficulties arising from specific circumstances can be easily remedied by way of an extension of time …”.

Secondly, the Court noted with approval at [29], referring to UR Power GmbH v Kuok Oils and Grains Pte Ltd [2009] EWHC 1940 (Comm), that “there was a general understanding among arbitration professionals that time for any challenges to a FOSFA and GAFTA appeal runs from the date of the appeal award”.

The Court noted at [19] that only two cases were found by counsel which “directly addressed the running of time under section 70(3) in the context of an arbitral appeal”. These two cases, the Court observed agreed on “the fundamental point: any challenge under the Arbitration Act 1996 to an appeal award must run from the date of the appeal award”. The Court then concluded at [20] that “[i]t therefore is entirely natural that the first limb of section 70(3) sets out the primary or default position in relation to the running of time, by reference to the date of the award”.

As a result, the Court applied the first limb time limit of s.70(3) AA 1996. Interestingly, the Court stated at [27] that had the Claimant challenged the FTT Award, the second limb of s.70(3) AA 1996 would have applied, meaning that time would have started running from the day the Appeal Award became available to the Claimant:

“[The Claimant’s counsel] submitted that, in the present case, the fact that the FTT Award was the subject of an arbitral appeal to the FOSFA Board of Appeal meant that time for an appeal under section 69 ran from the date when the Appeal Award was sent to the Claimant, rather than the date of the Appeal Award. I would have understood this submission, if the section 69 appeal had related to the FTT Award, rather than the Appeal Award … . However, the submission cannot be right where the appeal relates to the Appeal Award, and where there is no arbitral process of appeal or review in relation to the Appeal Award”.

Should time be extended under s.80(5) AA 1996?

On the length of the delay, the Court noted at [33] that “[a]t 15 days, the length of the delay is not enormous. However, at over 50% of the entire time allowed under section 70(3), nor is it trifling”. In other words, the Court regarded it as significant. Therefore, the next factor considered by the Court was whether the Claimant acted reasonably in letting the 28-days period expire.

To that extent, the Court noted that the main reason for the delay from 26 March 2025 to 10 April 2025 was the difficulty the Claimant encountered with the payment of “fees, costs and expenses” of arbitration due to sanctions.

The Court also noted that the Claimant changed three sets of Russian lawyers. Interestingly, the last change happened somewhere in mid-April 2025, i.e. in the period when the time for a s.69 AA 1996 challenge was running. Also, the Court noted that the previous Russian lawyers took the view that time started to run from 10 April 2025. When new English solicitors were hired at the end of April 2025, the time – as counted from the date of the Appeal Award – had already expired. These new English solicitors also took the view that time had started to run from 10 April 2025. The Court apparently disagreed with both opinions.

Finally, the Court did not consider the lack of English solicitors or the delay caused by finding new ones as a good reason for granting an extension. In that regard, the Court indicated at [38] that advice could instead have been sought from barristers who represented the Claimant in the arbitration.

Conclusion

The judgment confirms the very strict approach of English courts in relation to the time limits for appealing awards under the UK Arbitration Act 1996. In addition, it raised several interesting points. Firstly, the Court gave a lot of weight to case law and travaux préparatoires (DAC Report) and somewhat downplayed the text of the statute. Further, the Court found that a delay of over 50% of the time for appeal was significant. Finally, the Court ruled that neither the difficulties with payment caused by sanctions nor the change of lawyers were sufficient to justify the granting of an extension of time.

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